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1 Introduction and Motivation
Dynamic Networks. Large real-world networks are inherently very dynamic: the participants in peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks change over time, mobile nodes in wireless networks move in and out of each other’s
transmission range, and, in distributed data center networks, faulty machines need to be replaced by new
machines without interrupting the operation of the remaining network. Furthermore, they are resource-
constrained, unreliable, and vulnerable to attacks. For example, in P2P networks, peers (nodes) join and
leave at a high rate and the underlying network topology also changes continuously over time; these networks
are bandwidth-constrained, unreliable due to the high node turnover, and the open admission nature of these
systems allows malicious behaviour by nodes. Performing efficient computation in dynamic networks is
much more challenging than in traditional static networks. First, one has to deal with “failures” (nodes
getting inserted or deleted or communication links changing continuously) as part of the “normal” mode of
operation rather than as exceptions. Second, time and communication constraints are much more severe, and
hence it will be too expensive or even infeasible to run a static algorithm from scratch every time that the
topology changes. Dynamic networks especially need efficient distributed algorithms, since unlike static
networks, pre-processing (via centralized algorithms) is not usually possible. Furthermore, nodes typically
have only local knowledge (which is also changing continuously with changing neighbours and links) which
necessitates localized distributed algorithms. Hence a new theory is needed to understand and perform robust,
efficient, and secure distributed computation in such systems.
Much of the well-established theory of distributed algorithms (see e.g., [83, 97, 9, 60]) — developed over
the last three decades — has focused on static networks (where nodes do not crash and edges maintain opera-
tional status forever). Dynamic networks pose non-trivial challenges in solving even basic and fundamental
distributed computing problems, such as agreement, leader election, broadcasting, search, and routing. These
problems are basic building blocks in distributed computing and are widely used (see e.g., [83, 97, 9, 41]).
Unfortunately, distributed algorithmic techniques developed for static networks are not readily applicable
to dynamic networks [15]. Therefore, we need rigorous models and distributed algorithmic techniques for
dynamic networks.
P2P Networks. An important motivating example is P2P computing which has emerged as one of the
key networking technologies with many application systems, e.g., Skype, BitTorrent, CrashPlan, Symform,
Cloudmark, Bitcoin etc. Systems such as CrashPlan [42] and Symform [107] are relatively recent P2P-based
storage services that allow data to be stored and retrieved among peers [96]. Such peer-based data sharing
avoids costly centralized storage and retrieval and is inherently scalable. However, these systems are not
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fully P2P; they also use dedicated centralized servers in order to guarantee high availability of data — this
is necessary due to the highly dynamic and unpredictable nature of P2P. Cloudmark [38] is a large spam
detection system used by millions of people that operates by maintaining a hybrid P2P network; it uses a
central authority to regulate and charge users for participation in the network. A key reason for the lack
of fully-distributed P2P systems is the difficulty in designing highly robust and efficient algorithms for
large-scale dynamic networks. Indeed, P2P networks are highly dynamic networks characterized by high
degree of node churn — i.e., nodes continuously join and leave the network. Connections (edges) may
be added or deleted at any time and thus the topology changes very dynamically. In fact, measurement
studies of real-world P2P networks [53, 63, 104, 106] show that the churn rate (i.e. the number of nodes that
join/leave the network per unit time or round) is quite high: nearly 50% of peers in real-world networks can
be replaced within an hour. (However, despite a large churn rate, these studies also show that the total number
of peers in the network is relatively stable.) P2P algorithms have been proposed for a wide variety of tasks
such as data storage and retrieval [96, 50, 49, 33, 65], collaborative filtering [30], spam detection [38], data
mining [44], worm detection and suppression [85, 109], privacy protection of archived data [59], and recently,
for cloud computing services as well [107, 24]. However, all algorithms proposed for these problems have no
theoretical guarantees of being able to work in a dynamically changing network with a very high churn rate,
which can be as much as linear (in the stable network size). This is a major obstacle in implementation and
wide-spread use of P2P systems.
Distributed Computation in Dynamic Networks. Performing efficient distributed computation in highly
dynamic networks where both nodes and edges can change continuously by a large amount is a major
challenge. Indeed, when the churn rate is linear in the network size, in constant number of rounds the entire
network can be renewed! We would like distributed algorithms to work correctly and efficiently in such
networks that keep changing continuously over time (not assuming any eventual stabilization or quiescence —
unlike much of the earlier work on dynamic networks, e.g., [3, 48, 58, 4, 18, 23]). Recently, dynamic networks
have been considered in the context of distributed computation, mostly assuming the model of [91, 75, 76].
In this setting, algorithms and complexity bounds for problems like distributed consensus [77], random
walks [43, 16], token dissemination [51, 43], aggregation [40], and counting [2] have been developed.
(Section 5 has pointers to several recent works in dynamic networks.) Most of these works assume that the
set of participating nodes is fixed. In contrast, much less is known about dynamic networks with churn, i.e.,
where the set of participants can change over time. Thus it is important to develop a rich theory of dynamic
networks with high churn rate which is the focus of this article.
Byzantine Protocols. Besides dynamism, another major challenge is dealing with malicious (also called
Byzantine) nodes in the network which can try to foil the distributed protocol executed by honest (good)
nodes. Byzantine protocols are at the heart of secure and robust protocols that can tolerate the presence of
malicious nodes in a distributed system, such as a P2P network, which allows a large number of peers to
enter the network with little or no admission control. Such malicious peers acting alone or in collaboration
can cause disruption of service in P2P systems [1, 34, 81]. Designing scalable Byzantine protocols that work
in highly dynamic networks is significantly more challenging compared to static networks. Indeed, until
recently, almost all the work known in the literature (see e.g., [52, 69, 71, 73, 108, 74]) has addressed the
Byzantine agreement and leader election problem (defined in Section 3) only in static (bounded-degree)
networks, and these approaches do not work for dynamic networks with changing topology. Such approaches
fail in dynamic networks where both nodes and edges can change by a large amount in every round. For
example, the work of [108] showed how one can achieve almost-everywhere agreement1 under up to a linear
number — up to n, for a sufficiently small  > 0 — of Byzantine faults in a bounded-degree expander
network (n is the network size). The algorithm requires O(logn) rounds and polynomial (in n) number
1In sparse, bounded-degree networks, an adversary can always isolate some number of non-faulty nodes, hence almost-everywhere
is the best one can hope for in such networks [52].
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of messages; however, the local computation required by each processor is exponential. Furthermore, the
algorithm requires knowledge of the global topology, since at the start, nodes need to have this information
“hardcoded”. The work of [74] is important in the context of P2P networks, as it was the first to study scalable
(polylogarithmic communication and number of rounds) algorithms for Byzantine agreement and leader
election. However, as pointed out by the authors, their algorithm works only for static networks; here also the
nodes require hardcoded information on the network topology to begin with, and thus the algorithm does not
work when the topology changes. In fact, this work ([74]) raised the open question of whether one can design
agreement protocols that can work in highly dynamic networks with a large churn rate.
Consider the real-world example of Bitcoin — a fully-decentralized P2P- based digital money with
no central authority or middlemen [28]. A crucial aspect of Bitcoin is a computational mechanism that
allows fault-tolerant Byzantine agreement among all honest nodes to agree on all the transactions, despite
the presence of malicious nodes. This is a costly operation (called mining) that only nodes with very high
computational power can perform; furthermore there is non-trivial probability of failure leading to corruption
of the system. Hence, distributed computation in P2P systems must be robust to dynamism and failures, and
also attack- resistant, besides being efficient and scalable.
Focus of this article. Motivated by the above considerations, we focus on studying the following fundamental
distributed computing problems in dynamic networks (these are formally defined in Section 3):
1. Agreement: Nodes have to agree on a common value.
2. Search and Storage: Find data and resources in the network; store data reliably and securely.
3. Byzantine Agreement: Solve agreement problem under the presence of malicious nodes.
4. Byzantine Leader Election: Solve leader election problem under the presence of malicious nodes.
5. Expander Maintenance: Maintain an expander under adversarial dynamics.
In this article, we will give an overview of our recent results [15, 12, 11, 13, 14] that make progress
towards developing a distributed algorithmic theory of dynamic networks. These results are steps toward
designing provably efficient and robust algorithms for solving fundamental distributed computing problems in
highly dynamic networks (with churn), especially P2P networks. First, we will present a rigorous theoretical
framework for studying dynamic networks by presenting a model for dynamic networks with churn. Then we
will present efficient techniques and algorithms for solving agreement, Byzantine agreement, Byzantine leader
election, search/ storage, and expander maintenance. The algorithms presented are the first-known, fully-
distributed algorithms for the above problems that work under highly dynamic settings, i.e., high adversarial
churn rates. Furthermore, they are localized (i.e., do not require any global topological knowledge) and
scalable. The algorithms and techniques can serve as building blocks for implementing other non-trivial
distributed computing tasks in highly dynamic P2P networks. The techniques include efficient information
spreading, support estimation (estimating aggregate functions), and random-walk based methods. The article
discusses how these can be adapted to work even under highly dynamic networks with provable guarantees.
The techniques presented are lightweight, local, and scalable which are essential for performing efficient and
robust distributed computation in highly dynamic networks. Since the dynamic network model is adversarial,
the results are also applicable to a wide range of scenarios, in particular, to less stringent (and possibly more
realistic) settings. The results and techniques are also applicable to dynamic network models where only
edges changes (and nodes remain fixed) as well as to static networks (where nodes can fail or be Byzantine).
A main goal of this article is to present the results in a unified way and highlight the techniques involved—
this can be helpful in tackling other problems in dynamic networks with churn. Moreover, the techniques (and
results) also apply seamlessly to dynamic networks (without churn) as well as to static networks, yielding
new insights to well-studied problems. We also compare and contrast the above results with several related
results in dynamic networks (Section 5). We summarize and discuss key open problems in Section 6.
3
2 A Dynamic Network Model with Churn (DNC model)
The following model for dynamic networks that incorporates churn was first proposed in [15] and has since
been used in subsequent works with suitable modifications [12, 11, 10, 13, 14]. Henceforth, we will call the
model discussed below as the DNC (Dynamic Network with Churn) model.
Apart from nodes joining and leaving the network or failing over time or behaving maliciously, the
evolution of the network might also be triggered by coordinated attacks (e.g. denial-of-service attacks or
wireless jamming) with the goal of corrupting the communication in the network. In a large-scale network, it
is unrealistic to assume that all nodes faithfully execute the given protocol. Thus we must design scalable
algorithms that can handle adversarial dynamic changes, are robust against failures and can tolerate malicious
(i.e. Byzantine nodes [95]) that might collude and send corrupted messages. In particular, assume that the
dynamism is controlled by an adversary that comes in two flavors: (1) oblivious —- has complete knowledge
and control of what nodes fail or join and leave and at what time and has unlimited computational power —
but is oblivious to the random choices made by the algorithm and (2) adaptive — in addition to the above it
has knowledge of past random choices (but not current and future ones). Byzantine nodes, on the other hand,
have knowledge about the entire state of network at every round (including random choices made by all the
nodes) and can behave arbitrarily. However, they can communicate only through the (current) edges of the
dynamic network and cannot send messages to nodes which are not neighbors at that point in time. The two
key parameters of the DNC model are:
• churn rate: the number of nodes that can join or leave the network.
• number of Byzantine nodes (at any given time).
The DNC model is represented by a graph with a dynamically changing topology (both nodes and
edges change from round to round) whose nodes execute a distributed algorithm and whose edges represent
connectivity in the network. Communication is synchronous and occurs via message passing [97]. The
computation is structured into synchronous rounds, i.e., nodes run at the same processing speed and any
message that is sent by some node u to its neighbors in some round r > 1 will be received by the end of
round r. In a distributed setting, where transmission of messages can be orders of magnitude slower than
local computation, the expensive resource is communication. In this model, local computation (happening at
a node) is thus assumed to be free. (In all our algorithms, however, local computation has polynomial (in
n) complexity.) The focus will be on time (number of communication rounds) and number of messages —
the two traditional complexity measures of distributed algorithms [97]. We typically assume small-sized
messages, e.g., each message is of size O(polylogn) bits, unless otherwise stated. For the bounds considered
in this article, we mainly focus on time bounds, assuming that O(polylogn)-sized messages can be sent
over a link in one round (i.e., the CONGEST(polylogn) model [97]). A main objective in this research is to
design fast algorithms (running in a small, say, O(polylogn) rounds) that use small-sized messages that
can tolerate a large amount of churn and Byzantine nodes. It is important that algorithms be fast, since the
network itself changes dynamically by a large amount in every round.
The dynamic network is formally represented by a graph process G = (G0, G1, . . .) where Gr =
(V r, Er). Each node has an ID and at any round r, the ID’s of nodes in V r are distinct. Edges can change
arbitrarily in each round, but the underlying graphs are assumed to be connected and typically satisfy other
properties. For example, in the works of [15, 12, 11], each Gi is assumed to be a d-regular expander as
the high expansion allows one to tolerate a high amount of churn. In fact, expander graphs have been used
extensively as candidates to solve the agreement and related problems in bounded degree graphs even in
static settings (e.g., see [52, 69, 71, 73, 108]). It turns out that similar expansion properties are beneficial in
the more challenging setting of dynamic networks. Expander graphs are reasonable models in the context
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of P2P networks.2 Note that this model is quite general in the sense that, except for the expander property,
no other special properties are assumed. Indeed, expanders have been used extensively to model dynamic
P2P networks in which the expander property is preserved under insertions and deletions of nodes (e.g.,
[80, 92, 93]). (Section 3.4 addresses how the assumption of having an underlying expander can be maintained
over time despite large amounts of ongoing churn; this itself is an important issue.) Many works on dynamic
network models make similar assumptions on preservation of topological properties — such as connectivity,
expansion etc. — at every step under dynamic edge insertions/deletions — cf. Section 5. The issue of
how such properties are preserved are abstracted away from the model, which allows one to focus on the
dynamism. Indeed, this abstraction has been a feature of most dynamic models e.g., see the survey of [31].
Let n be the stable network size. Nodes might be subjected to churn, which means that in each round,
up to C(n) nodes can be replaced by new nodes; C(n) is called the churn rate. For all rounds r > 0,
|V r \ V r+1| = |V r+1 \ V r| 6 C(n). Churn can also capture node failures; these are nodes that need not be
churned out, but simply fail and are being replaced by new nodes. While many of the results that we discuss
hold when the network size undergoes some moderate (i.e., ±o(n) nodes) changes, we assume for simplicity
that the total number of nodes in the network remains n throughout the entire execution. Furthermore, edges
can change arbitrarily in each round (as determined by an adversary); this captures in a very general fashion
link availability over time.
The DNC model generalizes the more specialized churn-free dynamic model where the communication
topology (i.e., the set of edges) varies over time but the set of nodes remains fixed. This model has received a
lot of recent attention, see e.g., [91, 75, 76]. Thus the results and techniques discussed for the DNC model
also apply to the churn-free model when assuming expansion properties on the graph sequence. In particular,
it is important to note that they also apply to static expander networks where the set of nodes and edges are
static, but some subset of the nodes may fail or be Byzantine.
In addition to churn, the DNC model allows up to B(n) nodes to be Byzantine that can deviate arbitrarily
from the given protocol. (Typically, we will assume that B(n) 6 O(n), where  is a small positive constant.)
We say that a node u is honest if u is not a Byzantine node and use Vcorr to denote the set of honest nodes in
the network. We can think of Byzantine nodes as being controlled by an adaptive adversary, in the sense that
they know the entire states of all nodes at the beginning of every round and thus can take the current state of
the computation into account when determining their next action. This setting is commonly referred to as the
full information model (e.g., [26]). We consider the usual assumption that Byzantine nodes cannot fake their
identity, i.e., if a Byzantine node w sends a message to nodes u and v, then both u and v can uniquely identify
w as the sender of their received message. Note that this does not stop Byzantine nodes from forwarding fake
messages on behalf of other nodes as we do not assume any authentication service. The churn along with
Byzantine nodes captures node failures as well in a natural way and can model different kinds of networks
such as P2P as well as ad hoc and sensor networks.
We assume a global synchronous clock such that if a node u enters the network at some later round r,
then u knows the number of rounds that have passed since the start of the computation. However, any other
information about the network at large is only learned through the messages that u receives and nodes do not
have any a priori knowledge about who their neighbors will be in future rounds.
We now describe the assumptions and limitations of different adversaries in the DNC model. In every
round, the churn adversary determines which nodes are being replaced by new nodes, whereas the rewiring
of the connection links between nodes is under the control of the topology adversary. Since we are dealing
with a dynamic network where edges and nodes can change from round to round, one can separate these
kinds of changes given by the churn adversary and the topology adversary. The following describes the
sequence of events that occur in each round r > 1. Firstly, the churn adversary chooses up to C(n) nodes to
be replaced by honest nodes, yielding the set V r. We also consider the oblivious churn adversary, which is
2However, for other applications, such as ad hoc mobile networks, the underlying graph is better modelled as a geometric graph,
e.g., a random geometric graph or a grid graph.
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oblivious to the random choices of the nodes; note that this is equivalent to an adversary that fixes the entire
sequence of graphs in advance of the algorithm. Next, the topology adversary determines the new edge set
Er. We distinguish between adaptive and oblivious topology and churn adversaries. The former can observe
the entire state of the network in every round r (including all the random choices made until round r− 1), and
then modifies the graph for the next round. For example, an adaptive topology adversary can rewire the edges
for round r after inspecting the states of all nodes whereas the oblivious topology adversary must specify the
entire sequence of topological changes in advance before the algorithm is executed. It is important to note
that Byzantine nodes are always adaptive and unaffected by whether the topology and churn adversaries are
adaptive or oblivious.
After the adversaries have made their moves, the algorithm operates on the graph Gr = (V r, Er) in
round r. Each node u becomes aware of its current neighbors in Gr, can perform local computation and is
able to reliably exchange messages with its neighbors according to the edges in Er.
3 Fundamental Problems and Algorithms: An Overview
As mentioned in Section 1, the focus is on design and analysis of distributed algorithms for fundamental
distributed computing problems in dynamic networks (DNC model). These are described in detail in the
following sections.
3.1 Almost Everywhere (AE) Agreement and Byzantine Agreement
We consider the following version of the Agreement or the Consensus problem, that has been the subject of
intense research for over three decades (see e.g., [41, 83, 9, 15] and the references therein). We note that AE
Agreement is non-trivial in the DNC model due to churn (even without the presence of Byzantine nodes).
In addition, we study AE BYZANTINE AGREEMENT which is AE Agreement but under the presence of
Byzantine nodes as well as churn.
Let each node v ∈ V 0 have an associated input value from some value domain of size m; subsequent
new nodes come with value ⊥. Let V be the set of all input values associated with nodes in V 0 at the start
of round 1. Every node u is equipped with a special decision variable decisionu (initialized to ⊥) that can
be written at most once. We say that a node u decides on val when u assigns val to its decisionu. Note
that this decision is irrevocable, i.e., every node can decide at most once in a run of an algorithm. As long as
decisionu = ⊥, we say that u is undecided. AE BYZANTINE AGREEMENT requires that a large fraction of
the nodes come to a stable agreement on one of the values in V . More precisely, an algorithm solves AE
BYZANTINE AGREEMENT in R rounds, if it exhibits the following characteristics in every run:
Almost Everywhere Agreement: We say the network has reached almost everywhere agreement by round
R on the decision value val∗ if at least n−O(C(n) +B(n)) honest nodes in V R have decided on
the same value val∗ ∈ V .
Validity: If all honest nodes in V 0 start with val ∈ V , then val is the only admissible decision value for all
but O(B(n) + C(n)) nodes.
Stability: LetR be the earliest round where nodes have reached almost everywhere agreement on value val∗.
We say that an algorithm reaches stability by roundR if, at every round r > R, all butO(B(n)+C(n))
nodes in V r have decided on val∗.
3.1.1 Algorithms
The work of [15] addresses the AE agreement problem in dynamic networks (DNC model with no byzantine
nodes). Its main contribution is an efficient and scalable — i.e., each node processes and sends only
polylogarithmic (in n, the stable network size) messages per round, and local computation per node is also
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polylogarithmic — randomized distributed algorithm that guarantees AE agreement with high probability3
even under high adversarial churn rate — up to linear in n per round — in a polylogarithmic (O(log3 n))
number of rounds. Thus this result shows that agreement is possible even under linear (in the size of n)
amount of churn. The above result works under an oblivious churn adversary (where the sequence of graphs
are determined in advance). Under an adaptive adversary it is shown that the amount of churn that can be
tolerated is less, up to ε
√
n. (Moreover, this algorithm requires polynomial sized messages per round.) This
is essentially the best possible amount of churn that can be tolerated under an adaptive adversary, if one
requires fast algorithms (i.e., running in polylogarithmic number of rounds) [12].
The work of [12] further extends the work of [15] and gives an efficient distributed algorithm for AE
Byzantine agreement that works despite the presence of Byzantine nodes and high adversarial churn. (It is
important to note that the algorithms and techniques of [15] will fail to work if there is even one Byzantine
node.) This algorithm can tolerate up to O(
√
n/polylog(n)) Byzantine nodes and up to O(
√
n/ polylog(n))
churn per round, took a polylogarithmic number of rounds, and was scalable.
The above works presented general techniques for distributed computation in dynamic networks with
churn. The first technique was information spreading via “flooding”. In an expander-based dynamic network,
even under linear churn rate, it is possible to spread information by flooding if sufficiently many (a β-fraction
of the order of the churn, for some suitable β > 0) nodes initiate the information spreading [15]. In other
words, even an adaptive churn adversary cannot “suppress” more than a small fraction of the values. The
second technique presented was “support estimation” which is a randomized technique that can be used to
estimate the aggregate count (or sum) of values of all or a subset of nodes in the network. Support estimation
is done in conjunction with flooding and uses properties of the exponential distribution (similar to [39, 87]).
Support estimation allows one to estimate the aggregate value quite precisely with high probability even
under linear churn in a scalable way. But this works only for an oblivious adversary; to get similar results for
the adaptive case, we need to increase the amount of bits that can be processed and sent by a node in every
round to a polynomial in n.
The Byzantine agreement algorithm, crucially uses random walk- based techniques [12]. Random walks
are very simple, local, and robust and ideally suited for highly dynamic networks [101]. Random walks
are very local and lightweight and requires little index or state maintenance that makes it attractive to
self-organizing networks such as Internet overlay and ad hoc wireless networks [112, 29]. Flooding and
support estimation techniques are useful in solving the agreement problem under high churn but without
Byzantine nodes [15], but they fail in the presence of Byzantine nodes who can send a lot of (useless)
messages along with those of good nodes. On the other hand, if good nodes use random walks in their
information spreading protocol, the Byzantine nodes are no longer able to flood the network very much. This
proves crucial for getting a scalable protocol that uses only polylogarithmic message sizes per round and
finishes in polylogarithmic rounds. The basic idea of random walks is simple: use random walks to sample
tokens (approximately) uniformly at random. All nodes generate tokens (which contain the source node’s ID)
and send those tokens via random walks continuously over time. These random walks, once they “mix” (i.e.,
reach close to the stationary distribution), reach essentially “random” destinations in the network. Thus the
destination nodes receive a steady stream of tokens from essentially random nodes, thereby allowing them to
sample nodes uniformly from the network. While this is easy to establish in a static network, it is no longer
true in a dynamic network with Byzantine nodes and adversarial churn — these can cause many random
walks to be lost and also introduce bias. A key technical result called the Dynamic Sampling Theorem [12, 13]
(see Section 4) shows that “most” random walks do mix (despite byzantine nodes and large adversarial churn)
and have the usual desirable properties as in a static network. The dynamic sampling theorem allows almost
uniformly sampling among the honest nodes. For solving Byzantine agreement, a majority rule is used to
progress towards agreement.
It is important to note that random walk techniques work only under the topology-oblivious adversary;
3Throughout, with high probability (whp) means with probability at least 1− n−c, for some constant c > 1.
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on the other hand, if the adversary is topology-adaptive it can easily foil the progress of random walks. For
the topology-adaptive adversary, it is shown that information spreading techniques can be used, under the
additional assumption that nodes can directly contact any other node if it knows the ID of that node4. This
“overlay” link is used as a verification mechanism to authenticate the message sent by honest nodes. This
algorithm is not scalable as it requires up to polynomial in n bits to be processed and sent (per round) by
each node.
3.1.2 A Lower Bound
The bound of Ω˜(
√
n) on the amount of adaptive churn is essentially the best possible, if one wants fast (i.e.,
polylogarithmic run time) algorithms [12]. The proof of the lower bound result relies neither on the nature of
the connectivity nor on the presence of Byzantine nodes. The lower bound proof builds on well-established
ideas used in several consensus lower bound proofs [9]. It uses coin flipping games which were first studied
by Ben- Or and Linial [27]. Subsequently, these coin flipping games have been used several times to prove
lower bounds on running time of distributed consensus algorithms; see Aspnes [6] along with the references
therein. The proof structure is similar to the work by Ben-Or and Bar-Joseph [26], which in turn builds on
[57, 47, 6, 27]. We refer the reader to [12] for more details.
3.2 Leader Election
Leader Election and Byzantine Leader Election (BLE) are central problems in distributed computing and
have been extensively studied see e.g., [79, 13, 74]. We say that an algorithm A solves Byzantine Leader
Election in T rounds if, in any run of A, there is exactly 1 node u` such that
(a) all honest nodes terminate in T rounds whp,
(b) all except o(n) honest nodes accept u` as the leader, and
(c) node u` is honest with probability > 1− o(1).
3.2.1 A Byzantine Leader Election Algorithm
In the churn-only DNC model (where all nodes are honest), Leader Election problem can be solved by
solving Agreement (nodes will agree on the ID of some particular node); thus the algorithm of [15] will work.
However, in the Byzantine setting, an algorithm for AE BYZANTINE AGREEMENT does not directly solve
the BLE problem, since the value that (most of) the honest nodes agree may be a value that was generated by
a Byzantine node; using the agreement algorithm in a straightforward way does not give any guarantee that
an honest node will be elected as leader. Hence, a more involved approach is needed for Byzantine leader
election.
The work of [13] presents a scalable (O(log3 n) round) BLE protocol in the topology-oblivious model that
can tolerate only up to O(n 12−) Byzantine nodes (for a small constant  > 0) and up to O(
√
n/ polylog(n))
churn rate. We outline the main ingredients of the protocol. While Byzantine agreement itself does not
directly help, it can be used to generate an almost-everywhere public coin, i.e., an almost fair public coin
that is known to most honest nodes. The protocol requires nodes to independently generate “lottery tickets”
which are bit strings of certain length. Essentially, a node that has the winning lottery ticket becomes part
of the small set of finalists from which a leader will be chosen eventually. Note that the lottery tickets are
generated first. However, there is a problem in naively implementing this approach. The Byzantine nodes
who know the current network state including random choices of other nodes can lie about their lottery ticket
number, thus claiming to be the winner. To overcome this, we implement a verification mechanism that
allows the honest nodes to check whether the Byzantine nodes are lying. This mechanism is as follows. Once
4This is a typical assumption in P2P and overlay networks.
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a node generates its lottery ticket it “stores” it in about
√
n (randomly chosen) nodes (exceeding the number
of Byzantine nodes by an n factor). To verify whether a node is indeed the owner of the lottery ticket that it
claims, honest nodes will check with these
√
n nodes. This prevents a Byzantine node from falsely claiming
a lottery ticket that it did not generate in the first place. Such a storage and verification mechanism can be
implemented efficiently despite the presence of Byzantine nodes in a dynamic network. The last ingredient of
the protocol is an efficient and fault-tolerant mechanism to disseminate the identity of the leader to almost all
the honest nodes. This is done using random walks which is (again, as in the case of Byzantine agreement) a
main technical tool used throughout the algorithm.
A drawback of the above protocol is that it can tolerate only up to O(n 12−) Byzantine nodes (for a
small constant  > 0) and up to O(
√
n/polylog(n)) churn rate. This is essentially the best that our protocol
can handle for two reasons. Our storage and verification mechanism needs to store each lottery ticket in
about
√
n nodes, and to be scalable in terms of the number of messages generated, it can handle only about√
n nodes (each such node generates a ticket, thus overall there will be about n polylog(n) messages —
anything significantly more than this will cause much more congestion). The second reason is that for solving
Byzantine agreement, we use a majority rule to progress towards agreement [46, 12]. This majority rule
algorithm works as long as the number of Byzantine nodes is bounded by O(
√
n).
3.3 Storage and Search
The goal is to build a robust distributed solution for the storage and retrieval of data items. Nodes can produce
data items. Each data item is uniquely identified by an ID (such as its hash value). When a node produces
a data item, the network must be able to place and maintain copies of the data item in several nodes of the
network. To ensure scalability, we want to upper bound the number of copies of each data item, but more
importantly, we must also replicate the data sufficiently to ensure that, with high probability, the churn does
not destroy all copies of a data item. When a node u requires a data item (whose ID, we assume, is known to
the node), it must be able to access the data item within a bounded amount of time. To keep things simple,
we only require that u knows the ID of a node (currently in the network) that has the data item u needs.
While many P2P systems/protocols have been proposed for efficient search and storage of data (see e.g.,
[82, 11] and the references therein), a major drawback of almost all these is the lack of algorithms that work
with provable guarantees under a large amount of churn per round. In such a highly dynamic setting, it is
non-trivial to even just store data in a persistent manner; the churn can simply remove a large fraction of
nodes in just one time step. On the other hand, it is costly to replicate too many copies of a data item to
guarantee persistence. Thus the challenge is to use as little storage as possible and maintain the data for a
long time, while at the same time designing efficient search algorithms that find the data quickly, despite the
high churn rate.
The work of [11] presented efficient randomized distributed algorithms for searching, storing, and
maintaining data in dynamic P2P networks. These algorithms succeed with high probability (i.e., with
probability 1 − 1/nΩ(1), where n is the stable network size)) even under high adversarial churn in a
polylogarithmic number of rounds. In particular, the following algorithms are presented:
1. A storage and maintenance algorithm that guarantees, with high probability, that data items can be
efficiently stored (with only O(1) copies of each data item) and maintained in a dynamic P2P network
with churn rate up toO(n/polylog(n)) per round, assuming that the churn is controlled by an oblivious
adversary.
2. A randomized distributed search algorithm that with high probability guarantees that searches from as
many as n− o(n) nodes succeed in O(logn)-rounds under up to O(n/polylog(n)) churn per round.
The search algorithm together with the storage and maintenance algorithm guarantees that as many
as n − o(n) nodes can efficiently store, maintain, and search even under O(n/polylog(n))) churn
9
per round. The above algorithms require only polylogarithmic in n bits to be processed and sent (per
round) by each node.
The above search and storage algorithms crucially use random walks as well. In particular, they also use
the Dynamic Sampling Theorem (referred to as the Soup Theorem in [11]) which is discussed in Section
4.3. The Dynamic Sampling Theorem allows robust and accurate sampling of nodes despite high adversarial
churn—upto O(n/ polylog(n)) per round. It is important to note that the random walk-based technique
can handle churn only up to n/polylog(n). Informally, this is due to the fact that at least Ω(logn) rounds
are needed for the random walks to mix, before which any non-trivial computation can be performed. This
seems to be a fundamental limitation of our random walk based method. Note that the above search and
storage algorithms that can handle up to O(n/polylog(n)) churn do not assume any presence of Byzantine
nodes. However, they can be shown to tolerate up to O(
√
n/ polylog(n)) Byzantine nodes and up to a
O(
√
n/ polylog(n)) (topology-oblivious) churn rate (this follows from [13]).
Another useful technique in search and storage algorithms is construction and maintenance of (small-
sized) committees. A committee is a clique of small (Θ(logn)) size composed of essentially “random” nodes
(these random nodes are sampled using the Dynamic Sampling Theorem). A committee can be efficiently
constructed, and more importantly, maintained under large churn. A committee can be used to “delegate” a
storage or a search operation; its small size guarantees scalability, while its persistence guarantees that the
operation will complete successfully despite churn.
3.4 Expander Maintenance
A crucial ingredient that underlies all the results discussed till now is the assumption that though the topology
— both nodes and edges — can change arbitrarily from round to round and is controlled by an adversary, the
topology in every round is a (bounded-degree) expander graph. In other words, the adversary is allowed
to control the churn as well as change the topology with the crucial restriction that it always remains an
expander graph in every round. The assumption of an ever-present underlying expander facilitates the design
of efficient algorithms that are highly robust (tolerating a large amount of churn per round).
The assumption that the underlying topology is an expander in every round is a very strong assumption,
that itself needs to be satisfied if one desires truly-distributed protocols that work under little or no assumption
on the underlying topology. This motivates designing a distributed protocol that actually maintains an
expander topology under the presence of high adversarial continuous churn. Expanders have been used
extensively to model dynamic P2P networks in which the expander property is preserved under insertions and
deletions of nodes (e.g., see [93, 80, 92] and references therein). However, none of these works guarantee the
maintenance of an expander under the more challenging situation of high continuous adversarial churn.
The work of [14] presents an efficient randomized distributed protocol that guarantees the maintenance
of a sparse (bounded degree) topology with high expansion despite the presence of a large adversarial churn
— up to O(n/polylog(n)), where n is the stable network size. The churn is controlled by an oblivious churn
adversary. The adversary can remove any set of nodes up to the churn limit in every round. At the same time,
it should add (an equal amount of 5) nodes to the network with the following restrictions: (1) a new node
should be connected to at least one existing node and (2) the number of new nodes added to an existing node
should not exceed a fixed constant (thus, all nodes have constant bounded degree).
The expander maintenance protocol is efficient, lightweight, and scalable, since the overhead for main-
taining the topology is only polylogarithmic in n: requires only polylogarithmic in n bits to be processed and
sent by each node per round and any node’s computation cost per round is small (polylogarithmic in n). The
protocol guarantees that, despite a large adversarial churn, with high probability, there is a large expander
subgraph (n− o(n) size) present in the network in every round. The degree of each node is always bounded
5The protocol can be adapted to work correctly as long as the number of nodes is reasonably stable over time, say, between
n− κn and n+ κn for some suitably small constant κ (for the same amount of churn per round, i.e., O(n/polylog n)).
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above by a fixed constant; this is useful for applications, as the number of connections (neighbors) of a node
remains bounded and does not increase with the network size. The protocol assumes a short (O(logn) round)
initial “bootstrap” phase, where there is no churn6; after this, the adversary is free to exercise its power to
churn in/out nodes up to the churn limit.
This is the first-known, fully-distributed protocol that guarantees expansion maintenance under highly
dynamic and adversarial settings. The protocol is local (does not require any global topological knowledge),
simple, lightweight, and easy to implement. The protocol serves as a building block for enabling distributed
algorithms for fundamental distributed computing problems such as agreement, search and storage, and
leader election in dynamic P2P networks. In particular, the expander maintenance protocol in conjunction
with the protocols for agreement [15], and search and storage [11] enables a fully-distributed distributed and
autonomous protocol for these problems.
The main intuition behind the protocol is that it tries to maintain a graph that resembles a random
(bounded-degree) graph in every round whp. The protocol works by ensuring two interdependent invariants
(whp). The first invariant is that the nodes can sample from the set of ID’s in the network almost uniformly at
random. This is implemented via random walks. For the sampling technique to work efficiently, a second
invariant is needed, namely, that the network maintains good expansion. To achieves this, the protocol
connects each node to a constant number of other nodes chosen (almost) uniformly at random, leading to
a “random- enough” graph that resembles an expander, and thus bringing back to the first invariant. With
the two invariants being so intimately dependent on each other, the bootstrap phase in which expansion
is guaranteed is crucial in helping the protocol to get started. During this phase, the random walks based
sampling procedure gets started, which, in turn, allows the network to continue maintaining good expansion
beyond the bootstrap phase. While this high level idea is quite straightforward, there are some significant
challenges to be overcome in order to get the protocol to work.
We give a high-level overview of the main ideas of the protocol and some intuition for understanding
its design. Since nodes have to maintain bounded degree, and since each node requests as well as accepts
connection requests from other nodes, it is helpful to partition the degree set (with respect to a particular
node) into two sets — red and blue — where the number of blue edges will always be at most a constant
fraction (1/6) of the maximum number of edges (∆). Blue edges of a node are those that it requests and
red edges are the ones that it accepts; note that a red edge of some node will be a blue edge with respect to
some other node. The main invariant maintained by the protocol is the number of blue edges per node; if this
number falls below a certain threshold δ (due to loss of blue edges caused by churn), then the protocol will try
to regain the lost blue edges. The mechanism for creating new blue edges is as follows. Each node maintains
a buffer (called the prioritized token buffer) that contains only “mature” tokens (i.e., well-mixed tokens)
prioritized by time (recent is higher priority). When a node wants to create a blue edge it will choose one
of these tokens and contact the node whose ID is contained in the token. An important idea in the protocol
is that a node may reconnect even though it may not have lost any blue edge. The protocol uses a simple
mechanism to decide when to reconnect: when the number of mature tokens it receives falls below a certain
threshold, then it decides that it is not well-connected to the rest of the network and refreshes its connections.
The Dynamic Sampling Theorem shows that this local criterion works; it also shows that most tokens are
well-mixed (i.e., they are distributed in a near-uniform fashion and hence the endpoints of the blue edges are
as well) despite the actions of the adversary and the protocol.
As mentioned earlier, the protocol tries to maintain a graph that resembles a random graph in every
round (whp). Thus, in addition to reconnections that are caused due to lost blue edges, in every round, every
node with probability Θ(1/polylog n), simply drops all its blue edges and reconnects again. This refreshing
of connections creates new “random enough” edges continuously in the network, which is (also) useful in
showing expansion properties in every round. Since the number of blue edges is significantly less than the
6Without a bootstrap phase, it is easy to show that the adversary can partition the network into large pieces, with no chance of
forming even a connected graph.
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number of red edges there is a good (a constant) probability of establishing a connection in a round.
A complication that the protocol needs to handle is that since nodes can accommodate only constant
number of connections, many connection requests are turned down in a round (which occurs with constant
probability); thus many nodes that lose connections may remain “cut-off” (i.e., isolated from the “core”
network that has size n− o(n) whp) for a while. The adversary can attach new nodes to these cut-off nodes;
these new nodes will not get enough mature tokens, since the cut-off nodes themselves are starved of tokens.
This necessitates sharing of tokens between the new nodes and the cut-off nodes; such sharing of tokens is
problematic if continued for a long time (since tokens are longer independent among nodes). To address this,
the protocol allows these cut-off nodes to contact nodes using these shared tokens (called stale tokens) to
obtain fresh mature tokens that are mixed well. It is shown that nodes cannot remain cut-off for long and will
reconnect to the “core” network in at most O(logn) rounds (whp).
4 Algorithmic Techniques for Dynamic Networks
We now describe a toolkit of algorithmic techniques that we can use as building blocks to solve fundamental
problems in dynamic networks.
4.1 Information Spreading against a Topology-Adaptive Adversary
Recall that the adversary has the power to strategically isolate any given set of nodes S by simply subjecting
all neighbors of S in V r \ S to churn. Nevertheless, we can show that “almost all” nodes are able to
disseminate information to almost all other nodes in the DNC model. (Throughout this section, “almost
all” refers to a quantity of size at least n− O(C(n)) nodes.) Intuitively speaking, the vertex expansion α
of the underlying graph sequence effectively limits the adversary’s impact as it is impossible to effectively
“surround” a set that exceeds C(n) by a sufficiently large fraction, since this set must have at least αC(n)
neighbors in other parts of the network, assuming C(n) 6 n/2.
We now show how to implement an almost everywhere broadcast primitive in the DNC model, which
intuitively means that almost all nodes are able to broadcast a message that is relayed by other nodes and
reaches almost all nodes in the network within a time depending on the churn rate. To aid in the forwarding of
a broadcast message, we assume that any node can generate a flooding message with an attached terminating
condition. Then, the initiating node broadcasts the message to all of its current neighbors including itself.
When an honest node receives a flooding message, it continues to broadcast that message in subsequent
rounds as long as the terminating condition of the message is satisfied.
We first introduce the notion of influence which extends similar definitions for dynamic networks without
churn (cf. [75]). The dynamic distance from node u to node v in round r, denoted by DDr(u→ v), is the
number of rounds required for at least one message originating from u in r to reach v. Note that messages can
fall victim to churn if they reach a node that is churned out in the very same round. Suppose that node u joins
the network in round ru and, from round max(ru, r) onward, u initiates a message m for flooding whose
terminating condition is: 〈HAS REACHED v〉. If u is churned out before r, then DDr(u→ v) is undefined.
We define DDr(u → v) = ∆ if the first of those flooded messages reaches v in round r + ∆; formally
speaking this is the length of the shortest causal chain that reaches v starting in round r at u. Note that this
definition allows DDr(u→ v) to be infinite under two scenarios. Firstly, node v may be churned out before
any copy of m reaches v. Secondly, at each round, v can be shielded by churn nodes or Byzantine nodes that
absorb or corrupt the flooded messages.
The influence set of a node u after R rounds starting at round r is defined as Influencer(u,R) = {v ∈
V r+R : DDr(u → v) 6 R}, where V r+R denotes the set of nodes in round r + R. Note that we require
Influencer(u,R) to be a subset of V r+R. Intuitively, we want the influence set of u (in this dynamic setting)
to capture the nodes currently in the network that were influenced by u. Note however that the influence set
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of a node u is meaningful even after u is churned out. When considering only a single node u, the adversary
can easily prevent the influence set of this node from ever reaching any significant size by simply subjecting
the neighbors of u to churn in every round. This motivates us to define the influence set of any set of nodes
U ⊆ V r as
Influencer(U,R) , ∪u∈U Influencer(u,R).
We say that a node u ∈ V r is suppressed for R rounds if |Influencer(u,R)| < n− βC(n) where β is a
sufficiently large constant depending on the expansion of G; note that we assume βC(n) to be an integer to
keep the notation simple. Otherwise we say that u is unsuppressed.
Considering a set A0 of βC(n) nodes, we can leverage the graph expansion to show that the nodes in
A0 will jointly influence a large set B0 of > n − βC(n) nodes in T = O(log( nC(n))) rounds. Note that,
on its own, such a result is insufficient for achieving almost everywhere broadcast, as the joint influence
of the nodes in this set does not allow us to say anything about how many nodes in B0 are influenced by
a particular node in A0 in round r + T . However, since each node in B0 is influenced by at least 1 node
in A0, a combinatorial counting argument shows that there is a subset A1 ⊂ A0 of size 6 |A0|2 , the nodes
of which jointly influence a set B1 ⊆ B0 of > |B0|2 nodes in B0. As |B1| > n−βC(n)2 > βC(n), we can
argue the same way about B1 starting at round r + T over the next T rounds as we did for set A0 above. In
other words, the nodes in B1 will jointly influence a set of > n− βC(n) nodes in round r + 2T . Repeating
this argument Θ(logn) times, allows us to obtain a sequence of sets of exponentially shrinking size until
we are left with a singleton set consisting of a node u∗ ∈ A0 that influences > n− βC(n) nodes in round
r + T logn. Thus we have identified an unsuppressed node within our set A0, which is any arbitrary set of
βC(n) nodes. This implies that at most βC(n)− 1 nodes can be suppressed at any time, as any larger size
set of nodes must contain at least one unsuppressed node.
Theorem 1 (Almost Everywhere Broadcast). Consider the DNC model with churn rate C(n). Then, there is
a set S of > n−O(C(n)) nodes such that, if a node in S broadcasts a message in round r, this message is
received by all except O(C(n)) nodes in round r +O(log( nC(n)) logn).
4.2 Support Estimation Under an Oblivious Churn Adversary
In several contexts, we need to count the number of nodes in the network that either (i) have a certain property
or (ii) propose a certain value (such as in agreement protocols). In a dynamic setting, it will be impossible to
count the nodes precisely. Even if the nodes with the desired property are stable, they may be suppressed due
to churn. So we quite naturally resort to approximate counting, which is sufficiently useful for most purposes.
More formally, we have a DNC with churn that is up to linear in n in which an oblivious adversary has
selected some R nodes in V 0 and colored them red. R is called the support of red nodes. We want most
nodes in the network to estimateR under an oblivious adversary.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 4.1) uses random numbers drawn from the exponential distribution, whose
probability density function recall is parameterized by λ and given by f(x) = λe−λx for all x > 0. The
expected value of a random number drawn from the exponential distribution of parameter λ is 1/λ. Our
algorithm hinges primarily on an important property that relates the minimum of several exponentially
distributed random variables with their parameters.
Property 1 (see [61] or [86]). ConsiderK > 1 independent random variables Y1, Y2, . . . , YK , each following
the exponential distribution of rate λi. The minimum among all Yi’s, for 1 6 i 6 K, is an exponentially
distributed random variable with parameter
∑K
i=1 λi.
The idea behind our algorithm (see Algorithm 4.1 for pseudocode) exploits Property 1 in the following
manner. Each of theR red nodes generates an exponentially distributed random number with parameter 1
(and a precision of Θ(logn) bits) and floods its random numbers, but only propagating the minimum and
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eliminating all other random numbers. Since each node only needs to flood the smallest random number seen
so far, the message broadcast by each node per time step is only O(logn) bits (or O(polylog n) bits when
O(polylog n) executions are run in parallel). Out of theR red nodes, at leastR′ nodes of cardinality at least
R− O(C(n)) will be unsuppressed. Then the minimum s¯ among those R′ random numbers will also be
exponentially distributed, but with parameterR′. Thus 1/s¯ serves as an estimate ofR′, and therefore also for
R (within O(C(n))). To get a more accurate estimation of R, we can exploit sharp concentration bounds
(see [87] and pp. 30, 35 of [45]) when the process is repeated (in parallel) a sufficient number of times and
thereby obtaining the following claim.
Note: The following pseudocode is executed at every node u. P ∈ Θ(logn) controls the precision of our estimate.
At round 0:
1: Draw P random numbers s1, s2, . . . , si, . . . , sP , each from the exponential random distribution with rate 1.
{Each si is chosen with a precision of Θ(logn) bits to ensure that the smallest possible positive value is at most 1nΘ(1) .}
2: For each si, create a message mu(i) containing si and a terminating condition: HAS ENCOUNTERED A MESSAGE mv(i) WITH
A SMALLER RANDOM NUMBER.
{Notice that a message with index i will terminate only when it encounters another message with the same index, but smaller
random number. }
3: For each i, initiate flooding of message mu(i).
For the next t = Θ(logn) rounds:
4: Continue flooding messages respecting their termination conditions (mentioned in line number 2). I.e., among all messages of
the form m∗(i), only one message with the smallest random number will continue to flood; all others will be terminated.
{It is easy to see that the number of bits transmitted per round through a link is at most O(log2 n).}
At the end of the Θ(logn) rounds (i.e., the terminating round):







7: Node u outputs 1/s¯u as its estimate ofR. {Now that the estimation is completed, all messages can be terminated.}
Algorithm 4.1: Algorithm to estimate the supportR of red nodes whenR > n/2.
Theorem 2. Consider an oblivious adversary and let γ be an arbitrary fixed constant > 1. Let R¯ =
max(R, n−R). By executing Algorithm 4.1 to estimate bothR and n−R, at least (1− β)n nodes in the
terminating round will estimate R¯ to within [(1− δ)R¯, (1 + δ)R¯] for any δ > 2β with probability at least
1− n−γ .
We point out that the above technique fails when churn is controlled by an adaptive adversary (capable of
observing the random numbers generated by the nodes) or when Byzantine nodes are present. An adaptive
adversary can selectively churn out nodes that generate the smallest random numbers, while Byzantine nodes
can fake the minimum value.
4.3 Dynamic Sampling
We now turn our attention to another prominent algorithmic tool that has played a crucial role in designing
algorithms capable of handling adversarial dynamism and Byzantine faults. This random walks based tool has
low overhead (of only O(logn) random walk tokens communicated over each edge per time step) and allows
most nodes to sample a steady stream of Θ(logn) nodes from the network at each time step. Apart from
being lightweight, random walks work in a highly parallel and distributed manner that makes it difficult for
any adversary — whether it be the adversary that controls dynamism or the adversary that controls Byzantine
faults — to predict or manipulate. Although this technique has been useful in Byzantine settings [12], our
focus in this survey will be limited to the DNC model without any Byzantine nodes, but a churn rate of up to
O(n/polylog n) nodes per time step controlled by an oblivious adversary.
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1: for each round r do
2: for each node v in parallel do
3: Initiate Θ(logn) random walk tokens with:
(i) a time to live (TTL) timer set to τ ∈ Θ(logn), and
(ii) a stamp of the source node’s ID.
4: If there are any random walk tokens with expired TTL timers, v “consumes” their source node ID’s
as the required samples and discards the tokens.
5: Move each of the remaining random walk tokens to a uniformly and independently chosen neighbor
(after decrementing their TTL timers).
Algorithm 4.2: Random sampling in a dynamic network.
We will now present the random sampling algorithm (see Algorithm 4.2 for pseudocode) and sketch
its analysis. In order to get a steady stream of samples, the algorithm is typically executed ad infinitum
in the background so that any other protocol that requires samples can consume them as needed. At each
time step, every node u in the network generates Ω(logn) new random walk tokens that are stamped with
u’s ID. The random walk tokens take independent random steps (i.e., move to a neighbouring vertex with
equal likelihood) each round for a period of Θ(logn) rounds. At this point in time the tokens have mixed
sufficiently and the source ID stamped into the random walk token can be “consumed” as a sample. Clearly,
the samples may not all be good. For example, some of the samples may be pointing to nodes that have
already churned out, thereby making such samples meaningless in the current round. However, we show
that there is a large set of nodes (of cardinality (1− o(n))n) called Core such that nodes within the Core
receive good samples from other nodes within the Core. We now formally state our result and subsequently
sketch its proof. (For complete proof, see [11, 14].)
Theorem 3 (Dynamic Sampling Theorem). There exists a τ ∈ Θ(logn) such that for all r > 1, there exists
a set of nodes Core ⊆ V r ∩V r+τ for which the following properties hold for arbitrary choice of s ∈ Core
and d ∈ Core:
1. |Core| ∈ Ω(n/polylog n).
2. The number of tokens that pass through an edge at any round is at most O(polylog n) with high
probability.
3. A random walk token initiated in round r at s will terminate at d in round r + τ with probability in
Θ(1/n).
4. Finally, as a complement to the previous property, a random walk that terminated at d in round r + τ
was initiated by s with probability in Θ(1/n).
Proof Sketch. It is of course well-known via standard spectral theoretic analysis that random walks on
d-regular expander graphs will reach close to stationary distribution within O(logn) time steps. Moreover,
the d-regularity will ensure that the expected number of random walk tokens is uniform across all nodes,
thereby ensuring that at most polylog(n) tokens move across each edge per time step — both on expectation
and with high probability. As a result, Protocol 4.2 will clearly provide a steady stream of random samples
from the set of nodes when the underlying communication graph is a static d-regular expander.
There are two main issues to wrestle with when analyzing the random sampling algorithm when the
underlying communication graph can be dynamic. Firstly, under churn of O(n/polylogn) per time step,
many random walks will be eliminated along with nodes that are churned out. Secondly, can an oblivious
adversary capable of both churn and rewiring the graph at every time step inject significant bias? We need
a more nuanced analysis to show that the dynamic sampling protocol is indeed capable of providing good
samples to most nodes.
Before we grapple with churn, let us make a few observations about the random sampling when the node
set is fixed. This will allow us to focus on the mixing characteristics when random walks are preserved.
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Since the communication graph is a d-regular graph at each time step, the expected number of random walk
tokens at each node per time step is going to stay bounded. Moreover, Das Sarma et al. [43] show that the
standard spectral graph theoretic analysis can be applied to dynamic graphs when the node set is fixed. In
particular, when each of the communication graphs is a d-regular expander with each of their second largest
eigenvalues in absolute value upper bounded by λ < 1, the random walks will reach close to the uniform
stationary distribution.
To extend the analysis to networks with churn, we follow a two step process. In the first step, we transform
the dynamic network with churn into a virtual network without churn. We achieve this by copying the state
of each node that is about to be churned out on to a node that is churned in. So in this virtual network, the
random walk tokens are preserved. The results from [43] can be applied to the virtual network and from
this, the mixing time characteristics of tokens in the virtual network can be inferred. The second step will be
translate the random walk characteristics in the virtual network over to dynamic networks with churn. We
show that a churn of O(n/polylog n) nodes per time step can only have a limited impact and that most nodes
will in fact receive well-mixed tokens at every time step.
5 Other Related Work and Comparison
There has been a significant amount of work in dynamic networks in recent years. We discuss and compare
those that are related to the model and algorithms outlined in this article.
5.1 Dynamic Networks
Dynamic networks have been studied extensively over the past three decades. Some of the early studies
focused on dynamics that arise out of faults, i.e., when edges or nodes fail. A number of fault models, varying
according to extent and nature (e.g., probabilistic vs. worst-case) and the resulting dynamic networks have
been analyzed (e.g., see [9, 83]). There have been several studies on models that constrain the rate at which
changes occur, or assume that the network eventually stabilizes (e.g., see [3, 48, 58]). Some of the early work
on general dynamic networks include [4, 18] which introduce general building blocks for communication
protocols on dynamic networks. Another notable work is the local balancing approach of [17] for solving
routing and multicommodity flow problems on dynamic networks. Most of these papers develop algorithms
that will work under the assumption that the network will eventually stabilize and stop changing.
Modeling general dynamic networks has gained renewed attention with the recent advent of heterogeneous
networks composed out of ad hoc, and mobile devices. To address highly unpredictable network dynamics,
stronger adversarial models have been studied by [16, 43, 91, 77] and others; see the recent survey of [31]
and the references therein. The works of [77, 16, 43] study a model in which the communication graph can
change completely from one round to another, with the only constraint being that the network is connected
at each round ([77] and [43] also consider a stronger model where the constraint is that the network should
be an expander or should have some specific expansion in each round). The model has also been applied
to agreement problems in dynamic networks; various versions of coordinated consensus (where all nodes
must agree) have been considered in [77]. The recent work of [37], studies the flooding time of Markovian
evolving dynamic graphs, a special class of evolving graphs.
The model of [76] allows only edge changes from round to round while the nodes remain fixed. On
the other hand, this article focuses on a dynamic network model where both nodes and edges can change
by a large amount. Therefore, this framework is more general than the model of [76], as it is additionally
applicable to dynamic settings with node churn. According to [75], coping with churn is one of the important
open problems in the context of dynamic networks.
An important aspect of the algorithms discussed here is that they will work and terminate correctly even
when the network keeps continually changing. There has been considerable prior work in dynamic P2P
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networks (see [92] and the references therein) but these do not assume that the network keeps continually
changing over time. On the other hand, an important aspect of the protocols outlined here is that they work
even when the network is continually changing in an highly dynamic and adversarial manner. Most prior
algorithms (e.g., [80, 67, 94, 93, 20, 84]) will only work under the assumption that the network will eventually
stabilize and stop changing or there is a “repair” time for maintenance when there are no further changes (till
the repair/maintenance is finished); these algorithms do not work under high continuous adversarial churn.
Due to the mobility of nodes, mobile ad-hoc networks can also be considered as dynamic networks. The
focus of [91] are the minimal requirements that are necessary to correctly perform flooding and routing in
highly dynamic networks where edges can change but the set of nodes remains the same. In the context of
agreement problems, electing a leader among mobile nodes that may join or leave the network at any time
is the focus of [36, 35]. To make leader election solvable in this model, Chung et al. introduce the notion
of D-connectedness, which ensures information propagation among all nodes that remain long enough in
the network. Note that, in contrast to the model discussed here, this assumption prohibits the adversary
from permanently isolating parts of the network. The recent work of [64] presents information spreading
algorithms on dynamic networks (with no churn) based on network coding [5].
5.2 Fault-Tolerance
In most work on fault-tolerant agreement problems the adversary a priori commits to a fixed set of faulty
nodes. In contrast, [46] considers an adversary that can corrupt the state of some (possibly changing) set of
O(
√
n) nodes in every round. The median rule of [46] provides an elegant way to ensure that most nodes
stabilize on a common output value within O(logn) rounds, assuming a complete communication graph.
Expander graphs and spectral properties have already been applied extensively to improve the network
design and fault-tolerance in distributed computing (cf. [108, 52, 25]). Law and Siu [80] provide a distributed
algorithm for maintaining an expander in the presence of churn with high probability by using Hamiltonian
cycles. In [94] it is shown how to maintain the expansion property of a network in the self-healing model
where the adversary can delete/insert a new node in every step. In the same model, [93] present a protocol
that maintains constant node degrees and constant expansion (both with probability 1) against an adaptive
adversary, while requiring only logarithmic (in the network size) messages, time, and topology changes per
deletion/ insertion. In [8], it is shown that a SKIP graph (cf. [7]) contains a constant degree expander as a
subgraph with high probability. Moreover, it requires only constant overhead for a node to identify its incident
edges that are part of this expander. Later on, [67] presented a self-stabilizing algorithm that converges from
any weakly connected graph to a SKIP graph in time polylogarithmic in the network size, which yields a
protocol that constructs an expander with high probability. In [20] the authors introduce the hyperring, which
is a search data structure supporting insertions and deletions, while being able to handle concurrent requests
with low congestion and dilation, while guaranteeing O(1/ logn) expansion and O(logn) node degree.
The k-Flipper algorithm of [84] transforms any undirected graph into an expander (with high probability)
by iteratively performing flips on the end-vertices of paths of length k + 2. Based on this protocol, the
authors describe how to design a protocol that supports deletions and insertions of nodes. Note that, however,
the expansion in [84] is only guaranteed with high probability however, assuming that the node degree is
Ω(logn).
In the context of maintaining properties in P2P networks, Kuhn et al. consider in [78] that up to O(logn)
nodes can crash or join per constant number of time steps. Despite this amount of churn, it is shown in [78]
how to maintain a low peer degree and bounded network diameter in P2P systems by using the hypercube
and pancake topologies. Scheideler and Schmid show in [103] how to maintain a distributed heap that allows
join and leave operations and, in addition, is resistent to Sybil attacks. A robust distributed implementation of
a distributed hash table (DHT) in a P2P network is given by [22], which can withstand two important kind of
attacks: adaptive join-leave attacks and adaptive insert/lookup attacks by up to εn adversarial peers. This
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paper assumes that the good nodes always stay in the system and the adversarial nodes are churned out and
in, but the algorithm determines where to insert the new nodes. Note that, however, collisions are likely to
occur once the number of attacks becomes Ω(
√
n).
There has been a lot of work on P2P algorithms for maintaining desirable properties (such as connectivity,
low diameter, bounded degree) under churn (see e.g., [92, 68, 78], but these don’t work under large adversarial
churn rates. There has also been significant work in the design of P2P systems for doing efficient search.
These can be classified into two categories — (1) Distributed Hash Table(DHT)-based schemes (also called
“structured” schemes) and (2) unstructured schemes; we refer to [82] for a detailed survey. However much
of these systems have no provable performance guarantees under large adversarial churn. There has been
works on building fault-tolerant Distributed Hash Tables (which are classified as “structured” P2P networks
unlike ours which are “unstructured” e.g., see [92]) under different deletion models — adversarial deletions
and stochastic deletions. The structured P2P network described by Saia et al. [100] guarantees that a large
number of data items are available even if a large fraction of arbitrary peers are deleted, under the assumption
that, at any time, the number of peers deleted by an adversary must be smaller than the number of peers
joining. Naor and Weider [90] describe a simple DHT scheme that is robust under the following simple
random deletion model — each node can fail independently with probability p. They show that their scheme
can guarantee logarithmic degree, search time, and message complexity if p is sufficiently small. Hildrum
and Kubiatowicz [66] describe how to modify two popular DHTs, Pastry [99] and Tapestry [111] to tolerate
random deletions. Several DHT schemes (e.g., [105, 98, 70]) have been shown to be robust under the simple
random deletion model mentioned above. There also have been works on designing fault-tolerant storage
systems in a dynamic setting using quorums (e.g., see [88, 89]). However, these do not apply to our model of
continuous churn.
5.3 Distributed Agreement and Byzantine Agreement
The distributed agreement (or consensus) problem is important in a wide range of applications, such as
database management, fault-tolerant analysis of aggregate data, and coordinated control of multiple agents or
peers. There is a long line of research on various versions of the problem with many important results (see
e.g., [9, 83] and the references therein). The relaxation of achieving agreement “almost everywhere” was
introduced by [52] in the context of fault-tolerance in networks of bounded degree where all but O(t) nodes
achieve agreement despite t = O( nlogn) faults. This result was improved by [108], which showed how to
guarantee almost everywhere agreement in the presence of a linear fraction of faulty nodes. Both the work of
[52, 108] crucially use expander graphs to show their results.
We note that Byzantine adversaries are quite different from the adversaries considered in this article. A
Byzantine adversary can have nodes behaving arbitrarily, but no new nodes are added (i.e., no churn), whereas
in this case (an external) adversary controls the churn and topology of the network but not the behavior of the
nodes. Despite this difference it is worthwhile to mention that there has been significant work in designing
peer-to-peer networks that are provably robust to a large number of Byzantine faults [55, 66, 90, 102].
These focus only on robustly enabling storage and retrieval of data items. The problem of achieving almost-
everywhere agreement among nodes in P2P networks (modeled as an expander graph) is considered by King
et al. in [74] in the context of the leader election problem; essentially, [74] is a sparse (expander) network
implementation of the full information protocol of [73]. More specifically, [74] assumes that the adversary
corrupts a constant fraction b < 1/3 of the processes that are under its control throughout the run of the
algorithm. The protocol of [74] guarantees that with constant probability an uncorrupted leader will be
elected and that a 1−O( 1logn) fraction of the uncorrupted processes know this leader. The algorithm of [74]
does not work for dynamic networks. In another work [72], the authors use a spectral technique to “blacklist”
malicious nodes leading to faster and more efficient Byzantine agreement in static networks. The idea of
blacklisting, unfortunately, won’t work in the DNC model since the adversary can change the identities of
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Byzantine nodes by churning out old ones and introducing new ones. Other works on handling Byzantine
nodes in the context of P2P networks include [102, 19, 54, 56, 21, 32, 110]. The work of [62] presents a
solution for maintaining a clustering of the network where each cluster contains more than two thirds honest
nodes with high probability in a setting where the size of the network can vary polynomially over time.
6 Summary and Open Problems
Large-scale, highly dynamic networks are increasingly dominant in the real world. Distributed algorithms
that are robust, efficient, and secure are required. An important goal is to solve fundamental distributed
computing problems with provable guarantees, under strong models. This paper presents models, algorithms,
and techniques that work even under a high amount of adversarial dynamism and presence of Byzantine
nodes. The following are main highlights of the results discussed:
• The DNC model is a model for dynamic networks where both nodes and edges change continuously
over time (with no stabilization or quiescence) and allows a high adversarial churn rate and presence of
significant amount of Byzantine nodes. The model generalizes the churn-free dynamic model, where
only edges change and nodes remain fixed.
• It is shown that one can efficiently perform non-trivial distributed tasks such as agreement, leader
election, and storage and search even under a high rate of adversarial churn and presence of a large
number of Byzantine nodes under an oblivious adversary (both the churn and the topology are controlled
by an oblivious adversary). All these problems can be solved in polylogarithmic (in n, where, is the
stable network size) rounds in a scalable way (i.e., nodes send and receive only polylogarithmic
sized messages per round and process only polylogarithmic bits per round) and can tolerate up to
O(
√
n/polylog(n)) churn (per round) and O(
√
n/polylog(n)) Byzantine nodes (per round). If there
is only churn, then one can tolerate up to n churn rate for agreement and O(n/ polylog(n)) churn
rate for storage and search; again, the protocols take polylogarithmic rounds and are scalable.
• Information spreading, support estimation, random walks, and expansion properties of the underlying
graph prove crucial in designing robust, efficient, and local algorithms that tolerate a high degree of
churn and Byzantine nodes.
• The results and techniques also seamlessly apply to dynamic models without churn (where only edges
change) as well as to static networks (where nodes and edges remain fixed, but some nodes can fail and
others can be Byzantine). While the amount of failures and Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated is less
compared to protocols that are designed specifically for static networks (where up to a linear fraction
of Byzantine nodes can be tolerated [108]), the protocols here are extremely lightweight, simple, and
scalable compared to prior protocols.
• A key ingredient for all the results discussed here is that the underlying graph be an expander at all
times. To implement this in a distributed manner under high adversarial churn is challenging. The
article discusses a protocol that essentially achieves this — it maintains a large expander subgraph in
every round with high probability.
There are a number of key problems for further research:
1. Extend the results presented in this paper to general graphs, in particular to those which have expansion
less than a constant. More precisely, quantify tradeoffs between the amount of churn that can be
tolerated with the properties of the graph such as expansion or conductance.
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2. An important open problem is whether we can tolerate significantly more Byzantine nodes in a
dynamic network when the churn adversary is oblivious. More precisely, can we perform efficient
(polylogarithmic rounds) Byzantine agreement and leader election when the number of Byzantine nodes
is significantly more than
√
n/ polylog(n)) (per round) under an oblivious adversary that controls
both the churn and the topology. A similar question also applies to the storage and search problem
under presence of Byzantine nodes. Note that the O(
√
n/ polylog(n)) lower bound on the number
of Byzantine nodes (per round) and churn rate applies only when the churn adversary is adaptive; in
fact, this bound holds even when there are no Byzantine nodes and there is only adaptive churn [12].
The oblivious model is important for various reasons. Historically, oblivious models in the Byzantine
setting have been hard to solve (see. e.g., [27]); also it is less stringent and arguably more realistic.
It might be possible to tolerate as much as O(n/ polylog(n)) churn in this model; on the other hand,
no lower bounds are known. Another key open problem is whether one can design a scalable (that
processes and sends only polylogarithmic bits per node per round) algorithm for the agreement problem
(even without Byzantine nodes) under the adaptive churn adversary.
3. Is it possible to design protocols that work when the network size is not known and may even change
over time? This will result in a protocol that has fully local knowledge (the current protocols need
knowledge of n and allows only little change in network size). This issue requires devising a distributed
protocol that can measure network parameters such as size, average degree etc. under churn and
Byzantine nodes.
References
[1] P2p networks hijacked for ddos attacks. 2007. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/
2007/05/23/p2p_networks_hijacked_for_ddos_attacks.html.
[2] Sebastian Abshoff, Markus Benter, Manuel Malatyali, and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide. On
two-party communication through dynamic networks. OPODIS, pages 11–22, 2013.
[3] Yehuda Afek, Baruch Awerbuch, and Eli Gafni. Applying static network protocols to dynamic
networks. FOCS’87, pages 358–370, 1987.
[4] Yehuda Afek, Eli Gafni, and Adi Rosen. The slide mechanism with applications in dynamic networks.
ACM PODC, pages 35–46, 1992.
[5] Rudolf Ahlswede, Ning Cai, Shuo-Yen Li, and Raymond Yeung. Network information flow. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 46(4):1204–1216, 2000.
[6] James Aspnes. Lower bounds for distributed coin-flipping and randomized consensus. In Proceedings
of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (STOC), pages 559–568, 1997.
[7] James Aspnes and Gauri Shah. Skip graphs. SODA, pages 384–393, 2003.
[8] James Aspnes and Udi Wieder. The expansion and mixing time of skip graphs with applications.
SPAA, pages 126–134, 2005.
[9] Hagit Attiya and Jennifer Welch. Distributed Computing: Fundamentals, Simulations and Advanced
Topics (2nd edition). John Wiley Interscience, March 2004.
[10] John Augustine, Tejas Kulkarni, and Sumathi Sivasubramaniam. Leader election in sparse dynamic
networks with churn. IPDPS, 347-356, 2015.
20
[11] John Augustine, Anisur Rahaman Molla, Ehab Morsy, Gopal Pandurangan, Peter Robinson, and Eli
Upfal. Storage and search in dynamic peer-to-peer networks. In SPAA, pages 53–62, 2013.
[12] John Augustine, Gopal Pandurangan, and Peter Robinson. Fast byzantine agreement in dynamic
networks. PODC, pages 74–83, 2013.
[13] John Augustine, Gopal Pandurangan, and Peter Robinson. Fast byzantine leader election in dynamic
networks. DISC, pages 276–291, 2015.
[14] John Augustine, Gopal Pandurangan, Peter Robinson, Scott Roche, and Eli Upfal. Enabling robust
and efficient distributed computation in dynamic peer-to-peer networks. IEEE Symposium on the
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 350–369, 2015.
[15] John Augustine, Gopal Pandurangan, Peter Robinson, and Eli Upfal. Towards robust and efficient
computation in dynamic peer-to-peer networks. SODA, pages 551–569, 2012.
[16] Chen Avin, Michal Koucky´, and Zvi Lotker. How to explore a fast-changing world (cover time of a
simple random walk on evolving graphs). ICALP (1), pages 121–132, 2008.
[17] B. Awerbuch and F. T. Leighton. Improved approximation algorithms for the multi-commodity flow
problem and local competitive routing in dynamic networks. ACM STOC, pages 487–496, May 1994.
[18] Baruch Awerbuch, Boaz Patt-Shamir, David Peleg, and Michael E. Saks. Adapting to asynchronous
dynamic networks. STOC’92, pages 557–570, 1992.
[19] Baruch Awerbuch and Christian Scheideler. Group Spreading: A Protocol for Provably Secure
Distributed Name Service. ICALP, pages 183–195, 2004.
[20] Baruch Awerbuch and Christian Scheideler. The hyperring: a low-congestion deterministic data
structure for distributed environments. SODA, pages 318–327, 2004.
[21] Baruch Awerbuch and Christian Scheideler. Robust random number generation for peer-to-peer
systems. OPODIS, pages 275–289, 2006.
[22] Baruch Awerbuch and Christian Scheideler. Towards a scalable and robust DHT. Theory of Computing
Systems, 45:234–260, 2009.
[23] Baruch Awerbuch and Michael Sipser. Dynamic networks are as fast as static networks (preliminary
version). In 29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 206–220,
1988.
[24] Ozalp Babaoglu, Moreno Merzolla, and Michele Tamburini. Design and implementation of a p2p
cloud system. SAC, 412-417, 2012.
[25] Amitabha Bagchi, Ankur Bhargava, Amitabh Chaudhary, David Eppstein, and Christian Scheideler.
The effect of faults on network expansion. Theory Comput. Syst., 39(6):903–928, 2006.
[26] Ziv Bar-Joseph and Michael Ben-Or. A tight lower bound for randomized synchronous consensus.
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
(PODC), pages 193–199, 1998.
[27] M. Ben-Or and N. Linial. Collective coin flipping. In Silvio Micali, editor, Advances in Computing
Research 5: Randomness and Computation, volume 5, pages 91–115, JAI Press, 1989.
21
[28] Website of Bitcoin. http://www.bitcoin.org/.
[29] Marc Bui, Thibault Bernard, Devan Sohier, and Alain Bui. Random walks in distributed computing: A
survey. In 4th International Workshop on Innovative Internet Community Systems (IICS), pages 1–14,
2004.
[30] John F. Canny. Collaborative filtering with privacy. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 45–57, 2002.
[31] Arnaud Casteigts, Paola Flocchini, Walter Quattrociocchi, and Nicola Santoro. Time-varying graphs
and dynamic networks. CoRR, abs/1012.0009, 2010. Short version in ADHOC-NOW 2011.
[32] M. Castro, P. Druschel, A. Ganesh, A. Rowstron, and D. Wallach. Secure Routing for Structured
Peer-to-Peer Overlay Networks. In OSDI, pages 299–314, 2002.
[33] Yu-Wei Chan, Tsung-Hsuan Ho, Po-Chi Shih, and Yeh-Ching Chung. Malugo: A peer-to-peer storage
system. Int. J. ad hoc and ubiquitous computing, 5(4), 209-218, 2010.
[34] Nicolas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, and John Chuang. Content availability, pollution and poisoning
in file sharing peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
(EC), pages 68–77, 2005.
[35] Hyun Chul Chung, Peter Robinson, and Jennifer L. Welch. Regional consecutive leader election in
mobile ad-hoc networks. In DIALM-PODC, pages 81–90, 2010.
[36] Hyun Chul Chung, Peter Robinson, and Jennifer L. Welch. Optimal regional consecutive leader
election in mobile ad-hoc networks. FOMC, pages 52–61, 2011.
[37] Andrea Clementi, Riccardo Silvestri, and Luca Trevisan. Information spreading in dynamic graphs.
PODC, 37-46, 2012.
[38] Website of Cloudmark Inc. http://cloudmark.com/.
[39] Edith Cohen. Size-estimation framework with applications to transitive closure and reachability. J.
Comput. Syst. Sci., 55(3):441–453, 1997.
[40] Alejandro Cornejo, Seth Gilbert, and Calvin C. Newport. Aggregation in dynamic networks. In PODC,
pages 195–204, 2012.
[41] Miguel Correia, Giuliana Santos Veronese, Nuno Ferreira Neves, and Paulo Verissimo. Byzantine
consensus in asynchronous message passing systems; a survey. Int. J. Crit. Comput.-Based Syst.,
2(2):141–161, July 2011.
[42] Website of Crashplan Inc. http://www.crashplan.com/.
[43] A. Das Sarma, A. Molla, and G. Pandurangan. Fast distributed computation in dynamic networks via
random walks. DISC, 136-150, 2012. Journal version: Theoretical Computer Science, 381, 45-66,
2015.
[44] Souptik Datta, Kanishka Bhaduri, Chris Giannella, Ran Wolff, and Hillol Kargupta. Distributed data
mining in peer-to-peer networks. IEEE Internet Computing, 10(4):18–26, 2006.
[45] Amir Dembo and Ofer Zeitouni. Large deviations techniques and applications. Springer, 2010.
22
[46] Benjamin Doerr, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Lorenz Minder, Thomas Sauerwald, and Christian Scheideler.
Stabilizing consensus with the power of two choices. In SPAA, pages 149–158, 2011.
[47] Danny Dolev and H. Raymond Strong. Authenticated algorithms for byzantine agreement. SIAM J.
Comput., 12(4):656–666, 1983.
[48] Shlomi Dolev. Self-stabilization. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2000.
[49] P. Druschel and A. Rowstron. Past: A large-scale, persistent peer-to-peer storage utility. In HotOS
VIII, pages 75–80, 2001.
[50] P. Druschel and A. Rowstron. Storage management and caching in past, a large-scale, persistent
peer-to-peer storage utility. In Proc. of ACM SOSP, 188-201, 2001.
[51] Chinmoy Dutta, Gopal Pandurangan, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Zhifeng Sun, and Emanuele Viola. On
the complexity of information spreading in dynamic networks. SODA, pages 717–736, 2013.
[52] Cynthia Dwork, David Peleg, Nicholas Pippenger, and Eli Upfal. Fault tolerance in networks of
bounded degree. SIAM J. Comput., 17(5):975–988, 1988.
[53] Jarret Falkner, Michael Piatek, John P. John, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Thomas E. Anderson.
Profiling a million user DHT. In Internet Measurement Conference, pages 129–134, 2007.
[54] Amos Fiat, Steve Gribble, Anna Karlin, Jared Saia, and Stefan Saroiu. Dynamically Fault-Tolerant
Content Addressable Networks. Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer
Systems, 270-279, 2002.
[55] Amos Fiat and Jared Saia. Censorship resistant peer-to-peer content addressable networks. In SODA,
pages 94–103, 2002.
[56] Amos Fiat, Jared Saia, and Maxwell Young. Making chord robust to byzantine attacks. In ESA, pages
803–814, 2005.
[57] Michael J. Fischer and Nancy A. Lynch. A lower bound for the time to assure interactive consistency.
Inf. Process. Lett., 14(4):183–186, 1982.
[58] E. Gafni and B. Bertsekas. Distributed algorithms for generating loop-free routes in networks with
frequently changing topology. IEEE Trans. Comm., 29(1):1118, 1981.
[59] Roxana Geambasu, Tadayoshi Kohno, Amit A. Levy, and Henry M. Levy. Vanish: Increasing data
privacy with self-destructing data. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 299–316, 2009.
[60] Sukumar Ghosh. Distributed Systems: An Algorithmic Approach. CRC Press, 2006.
[61] C.M. Grinstead and J.L. Snell. Introduction to probability. American Mathematical Society, 1997.
[62] Rachid Guerraoui, Florian Huc, and Anne-Marie Kermarrec. Highly dynamic distributed computing
with byzantine failures. In PODC, pages 176–183, 2013.
[63] P. Krishna Gummadi, Stefan Saroiu, and Steven D. Gribble. A measurement study of napster and
gnutella as examples of peer-to-peer file sharing systems. Computer Communication Review, 32(1):82,
2002.
[64] Bernhard Haeupler and David Karger. Faster information dissemination in dynamic networks via
network coding. In ACM PODC, pages 381–390, 2011.
23
[65] Ragib Hasan, Zahid Anwar, William Yurcik, Larry Brumbaugh, and Roy Campbell. A survey of
peer-to-peer storage techniques for distributed file systems. In Proc of ITCC, pages 205–213, 2005.
[66] Kirsten Hildrum and John Kubiatowicz. Asymptotically efficient approaches to fault-tolerance in
peer-to-peer networks. In DISC, pages 321–336, 2003.
[67] Riko Jacob, Andre´a W. Richa, Christian Scheideler, Stefan Schmid, and Hanjo Ta¨ubig. A distributed
polylogarithmic time algorithm for self-stabilizing skip graphs. PODC, pages 131–140, 2009.
[68] Tim Jacobs and Gopal Pandurangan. Stochastic analysis of a churn-tolerant structured peer-to-peer
scheme. Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, 6(1), 1-14, 2013.
[69] Bruce M. Kapron, David Kempe, Valerie King, Jared Saia, and Vishal Sanwalani. Fast asynchronous
byzantine agreement and leader election with full information. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 6(4),
2010.
[70] M. Kashoek and D. Karger. Koorde: A simple degree optimal distributed hash table. IPTPS, 98-107,
2003.
[71] Valerie King and Jared Saia. Breaking the O(n2) bit barrier: Scalable byzantine agreement with an
adaptive adversary. J. ACM, 58:18:1–18:24, July 2011.
[72] Valerie King and Jared Saia. Faster agreement via a spectral method for detecting malicious behavior.
In SODA, pages 785–800, 2014.
[73] Valerie King, Jared Saia, Vishal Sanwalani, and Erik Vee. Scalable leader election. In SODA, pages
990–999, 2006.
[74] Valerie King, Jared Saia, Vishal Sanwalani, and Erik Vee. Towards secure and scalable computation in
peer-to-peer networks. In FOCS, pages 87–98, 2006.
[75] F. Kuhn and R. Oshman. Dynamic networks: Models and algorithms. SIGACT News, 42(1):82–96,
2011.
[76] Fabian Kuhn, Nancy Lynch, and Rotem Oshman. Distributed computation in dynamic networks. In
ACM STOC, pages 513–522, 2010.
[77] Fabian Kuhn, Rotem Oshman, and Yoram Moses. Coordinated consensus in dynamic networks. PODC,
pages 1–10, 2011.
[78] Fabian Kuhn, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer. Towards worst-case churn resistant peer-to-peer
systems. Distributed Computing, 22(4):249–267, 2010.
[79] Shay Kutten, Gopal Pandurangan, David Peleg, Peter Robinson, and Amitabh Trehan. On the
complexity of universal leader election. PODC, pages 100–109, 2013. Journal version: Journal of the
ACM, 62(1), 7:1-7:27, 2015.
[80] C. Law and K.-Y. Siu. Distributed construction of random expander networks. INFOCOM 2003, pages
2133 – 2143, 2003.
[81] James Li. A survey of peer-to-peer network security issues. 2007. http://www.cse.wustl.
edu/˜jain/cse571-07/ftp/p2p/.
24
[82] Eng Keong Lua, Jon Crowcroft, Marcelo Pias, Ravi Sharma, and Steven Lim. A survey and comparison
of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes. IEEE communications surveys and tutorials, 7(1-4), 72-93,
2005.
[83] Nancy Lynch. Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufman Publishers, San Francisco, USA, 1996.
[84] Peter Mahlmann and Christian Schindelhauer. Peer-to-peer networks based on random transformations
of connected regular undirected graphs. SPAA, pages 155–164, 2005.
[85] David J. Malan and Michael D. Smith. Host-based detection of worms through peer-to-peer cooperation.
WORM, pages 72–80, 2005.
[86] Michael Mitzenmacher and Eli Upfal. Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and
Probabilistic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[87] Damon Mosk-Aoyama and Devavrat Shah. Fast distributed algorithms for computing separable
functions. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 54(7):2997–3007, 2008.
[88] Moni Naor and Udi Wieder. Scalable and dynamic quorum systems. In PODC, 114-122, 2003.
[89] Moni Naor and Uri Nadav. The dynamic and-or quorum system. In DISC, 472-486, 2005.
[90] Moni Naor and Udi Wieder. A simple fault tolerant distributed hash table. In IPTPS, pages 88–97,
2003.
[91] Regina O’Dell and Roger Wattenhofer. Information dissemination in highly dynamic graphs. In
DIALM-POMC, pages 104–110, 2005.
[92] Gopal Pandurangan, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Eli Upfal. Building low-diameter P2P networks. In
FOCS, pages 492–499, 2001.
[93] Gopal Pandurangan, Peter Robinson, and Amitabh Trehan. Dex: Self-healing expanders. IEEE IPDPS,
702-711, 2014.
[94] Gopal Pandurangan and Amitabh Trehan. Xheal: localized self-healing using expanders. In Cyril
Gavoille and Pierre Fraigniaud, editors, PODC, pages 301–310, 2011.
[95] Marshall C. Pease, Robert E. Shostak, and Leslie Lamport. Reaching agreement in the presence of
faults. J. ACM, 27(2):228–234, 1980.
[96] Arjan Peddemors. Cloud storage and peer-to-peer storage - end-user considerations and product
overview. http://www.novay.nl/okb/publications/152, 2010.
[97] David Peleg. Distributed computing: a locality-sensitive approach. Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 2000.
[98] S. Ratnasamy, P. Francis, M. Handley, R. Karp, and S. Shenker. A scalable content addressable
network. ACM SIGCOMM, 161-172, 2001.
[99] A. Rowstron and P. Druschel. Pastry: Scalable, decentralized object location, and routing for large-
scale peer-to-peer systems. In Proc. of the IFIP/ACM Intenrational Conference on Distributed Systems
Platforms, 329–350, 2001.
[100] J. Saia, A. Fiat, S. Gribble, A. Karlin, and S. Saroiu. Dynamically fault-tolerant content addressable
networks. Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 270-279, 2002.
25
[101] Atish Das Sarma, Danupon Nanongkai, Gopal Pandurangan, and Prasad Tetali. Distributed random
walks. J. ACM, 60(1):2, 2013.
[102] Christian Scheideler. How to spread adversarial nodes?: rotate! STOC, pages 704–713, 2005.
[103] Christian Scheideler and Stefan Schmid. A distributed and oblivious heap. ICALP, pages 571–582.
2009.
[104] Subhabrata Sen and Jia Wang. Analyzing peer-to-peer traffic across large networks, IMC, pages
137–150, 2002.
[105] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, F. Kaashoek, and H. Balakrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer
lookup service for internet applications. SIGCOMM, pages 149–160, 2001.
[106] Daniel Stutzbach and Reza Rejaie. Understanding churn in peer-to-peer networks. IMC, 189-202,
2006.
[107] Website of Symform:. http://www.symform.com/.
[108] Eli Upfal. Tolerating a linear number of faults in networks of bounded degree. Inf. Comput., 115(2):312–
320, 1994.
[109] Vasileios Vlachos, Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis, and Diomidis Spinellis. Security applications
of peer-to-peer networks. Comput. Netw., 45:195–205, June 2004.
[110] Maxwell Young, Aniket Kate, Ian Goldberg, and Martin Karsten. Practical Robust Communication in
DHTs Tolerating a Byzantine Adversary. In ICDCS, pages 263–272, 2010.
[111] B. Zhao, J. Kubiatowicz, and A. Joseph. Tapestry: An infrastructure for fault-tolerant wide-area
location and routing. Technical Report UCB/CSD-01-1141, UC Berkeley, April, 2001.
[112] Ming Zhong and Kai Shen. Random walk based node sampling in self-organizing networks. Operating
Systems Review, 40(3):49–55, 2006.
26
